UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION

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United	States of America,) Case No. 18-570 ST
	<i>Plaintiff</i> , v.) STIPULATED ORDER EXCLUDING TIME) UNDER THE SPEEDY TRIAL ACT
	Plaintiff, v. Nael Angev Defendant(s).)))
For the reasons stated by the parties on the record on \(\frac{18\lq}{18\lq} \), the court excludes time under the Speedy Trial Act from \(\frac{18\lq}{18\lq} \) to \(\frac{5\lq}{17\lq} \) and finds that the ends of justice served by the continuance outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial. See 18 U.S.C. \(\frac{8}{3161(h)(7)(A)} \). The court makes this finding and bases this continuance on the following factor(s):		
	Failure to grant a continuance would See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(B)(i).	d be likely to result in a miscarriage of justice.
	defendants, the nature of the por law, that it is unreasonable to exp	ex, due to [check applicable reasons] the number of prosecution, or the existence of novel questions of fact extracted adequate preparation for pretrial proceedings or the trial ned by this section. See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(B)(ii).
	Failure to grant a continuance would taking into account the exercise of d	d deny the defendant reasonable time to obtain counsel, due diligence. See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(B)(iv).
	Failure to grant a continuance would counsel's other scheduled case composee 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(B)(iv).	d unreasonably deny the defendant continuity of counsel, given mitments, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
\nearrow	Failure to grant a continuance would necessary for effective preparation, See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(B)(iv).	d unreasonably deny the defendant the reasonable time taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
	With the consent of the defendant, and taking into account the public interest in the prompt disposition of criminal cases, the court sets the preliminary hearing to the date set forth in the first paragraph and — based on the parties' showing of good cause — finds good cause for extending the time limits for a preliminary hearing under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 5.1 and for extending the 30-day time period for an indictment under the Speedy Trial Act (based on the exclusions set forth above). See Fed. R. Crim. P. 5.1; 18 U.S.C. § 3161(b).	
IT IS	SO ORDERED.	1 6
DATED: 4/18/19 Jacqueline Scott Corley		
	·	United States Magistrate Judge
STIDI	JLATED:	Costs
Attorney for Defendant Assistant United States Attorney		

Attorney for Defendant